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AbstrAct
The paper aims to provide advantages and disadvantages of  various fo-
rums stipulated under the United Nations Convention on Law of  the Sea 
(UNCLOS)1 to settle disputes related to sea. Pursuant to unsuccessful long 
diplomatic negotiations among the South Asian States, this paper not only 
helps contexualize the debates the usefulness of  dispute settlement forums 
under the UNCLOS, it also underline the importance of  Section 3 of  Part 
XV of  the UNCLOS which allows the states to exclude few crucial subject 
matters viz., maritime delimitation, etc from the jurisdiction of  forums sti-
pulated under the UNCLOS. Hence, the study examines the usefulness of  
Declarations made by the States under the UNCLOS. The study further in-
vestigates the state practice on exclusion of  subject “maritime delimitation” 
from compulsory settlement system of  UNCLOS.
Keywords: ICJ. ITLOS. Arbitral Tribunal. Compulsory settlement. Mariti-
me delimitation. CLCS. Exclusion. State practice.
1. IntroductIon
By July 2016, 88 States including India have made declaration under Ar-
ticles 287, 298 and 310 of  the United Nations Convention on the Law of  
the Sea (UNCLOS). These declarations were made by the States partly in 
response of  indicating their preferences of  forums mentioned in Article 
287 of  the UNCLOS. Among them, many States have already experienced 
the importance of  the declaration which indicated preference of  forums for 
settlement of  maritime disputes, excluded military activities from compul-
sory settlement of  UNCLOS, and clarified their position/understanding on 
certain provisions of  UNCLOS. Compulsory settlement system under the 
UNCLOS is one of  the central components of  UNCLOS. The number of  
declarations revised by many States in recent years on many aspects of  law 
of  the sea seems to indicate that what India should do. This paper thus ex-
plores in what situations compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions 
under the UNCLOS may or may not useful to India.
South Asian States except Bangladesh has not yet made declarations un-
der Articles 287, 298 and 310 of  UNCLOS. States are rapidly revising their 
declarations over the past twenty years, however its effectiveness are widely 
debated. In this paper, author synthesizes academic and practitioners insi-
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397.
* Recebido em 03/11/2016
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** Assistant Professor (Senior) and Deputy 
Director, Indian Society of  International Law, 
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ghts on effective declarations. Author argues that de-
clarations under Articles 287, 298 and 310 does actually 
assist in preventing international litigations in unexpec-
ted forum/s. 
Part XV of  UNCLOS 1982 contains the dispute set-
tlement clauses. Section 1 of  Part XV, entitled “General 
Provisions”, essentially requires States to settle disputes 
through diplomatic channels prior to referring the mat-
ter to the compulsory procedures prescribed in Section 
2 of  Part XV. Part XV describes that some subject mat-
ters (freedom of  navigations, over-flight, and laying of  
submarine cables and pipelines; protection and preser-
vation of  marine environment; fishing; marine scienti-
fic research; maritime delimitation; and finally military 
activities) are essentially required to be settled through 
the forum prescribed by the UNCLOS i.e., third par-
ty dispute settlement (Section 2 of  Part XV). Also this 
part allows States to exclude some subject-matters from 
the jurisdiction of  forums prescribed by the UNCLOS 
(Section 3 of  Part XV). 
Accordingly, Part XV has been divided into three 
Sections. Section 1 prescribes some general obligations 
for States to seek mutual and voluntary dispute settle-
ment. Section 2 provides for compulsory dispute set-
tlement mechanisms that result into binding decisions2 
and Section 3 exempts some subject matters from the 
applicability of  Section 2 known as optional exclusions. 
Thus after the exhaustion of  the measures prescribed 
for the voluntarily settlement of  the disputes under Sec-
tion 1 and subject to the exceptions carved out under 
Section 3, the disputes related to the interpretation or 
application of  this Convention have to be compulsorily 
settled as per the mechanisms prescribed under Section 
2. It is also important to underline the essence that af-
ter the exhaustion of  the measures prescribed for the 
voluntary settlement of  disputes under Section 1 and 
subject to the exceptions carved out under Section 3, 
the disputes related to the interpretation or application 
of  this Convention have to be compulsorily settled as 
per the mechanisms prescribed under Section 2. 
2 The binding and compulsory dispute settlement procedures 
were to be “the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium of  the 
compromise must be balanced” (Memorandum by the President of  
the Conference on doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9, UN Doc.A/CONF.62/
WP.9/Add.1 (1976) reprinted in 5 Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of  the Sea: Official Records at p. 122). 
2. bAckground And forums of dIspute 
settlement under the unclos
Section 2 (Articles 286-296) of  Part XV of  the UN-
CLOS seeks compulsory settlement of  disputes that re-
sult in binding decisions but the State parties have leve-
rage to choose one or more forums or give preference 
among forums identified under the UNCLOS. Article 
287 prescribes four mechanisms that could be used by 
member States to settle their disputes. These mechanis-
ms are as follows:
• the International Tribunal for the Law of  the 
Sea established in accordance with Annex VI 
of  the UNCLOS
• the International Court of  Justice
• an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VII
• a special arbitral tribunal constituted in 
accordance with Annex VIII for one or more 
of  the categories of  disputes specified therein. 
These categories are as follows: (1) fisheries, 
(2) protection and preservation of  the marine 
environment, (3) marine scientific research, 
and (4) navigation, including pollution from 
vessels and by dumping.3
Thus, State Parties are required to declare their choi-
ce or choices among these options either at the time 
of  signature, ratification or afterwards.4 However, if  the 
disputing parties fail in agreeing on a forum for dispute 
settlement either by virtue of  their declaration or mu-
tually after the rise of  dispute, such disputes will auto-
matically be submitted to the arbitral tribunal constitu-
ted under Annex. VII.5 Thus, arbitration under Annex. 
VII will always be a default mechanism to settle the dis-
putes in any case of  discord as to the respective forums. 
The increasing awareness about the Declaration under 
Article 287 is growing among South Asian States. The 
declaration made under Article 287 (1) in respect of  fo-
rums, however, can be withdrawn after three months of  
the deposition of  the notice of  revocation to the UN 
Secretary General.6 
It is also important to note here that any declaration 
under Article 287(1) does not affect the obligation of  
3 Article 1, Annex. VIII. Special Arbitration, UNCLOS 1982.
4 Article 287 (1), UNCLOS 1982.
5 Article 287 (3)&(5), UNCLOS 1982.
6 Article 287 (6), UNCLOS 1982. It is also important to note that 
this revocation of  declaration is different from the revocation of  
optional declaration under Article 298 (2) of  the Convention.
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a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of  the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber under Part XI, Section 5.7 Thus the 
jurisdiction of  the Sea Bed Dispute Chamber neither 
affects nor be affected by any such declaration. The de-
claration under Article 287 (1) only relates to the de-
claration of  the appropriate forum for the compulsory 
settlement of  disputes resulting in binding decisions. 
The basic purpose for providing these options of  
forums under the UNCLOS is to assuage the concerns 
of  many States in respect of  some existing forums of  
dispute settlement. For instance, Cuba expressly stated 
that it does not accept the jurisdiction of  the ICJ un-
der Article 287. States were having different opinions 
during the negotiation of  UNCLOS III as to the exact 
forum for the compulsory settlement of  disputes. It 
seems essential to understand the basic aspirations and 
fears of  States during negotiations that caused the in-
clusion of  the provisions for four different forums for 
the compulsory settlement of  disputes. It will help in 
evaluating those concerns in the current state of  affairs 
before making any declaration by States.  There were 
mainly four groups advocating different forums for the 
compulsory settlement of  disputes.8 The first group 
was advocating for the conferment of  jurisdiction to 
the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) over the dis-
putes related to the law of  the sea. (Netherlands and 
Switzerland) This group pointed out the contribution 
of  ICJ’s decisions in the development of  law of  the 
sea.9 They emphasised the need for the uniformity of  
international jurisprudence and underlined the fear of  
conflicting decisions if  other body would be entrusted 
with the powers of  compulsory settlement of  disputes. 
The similar concerns were also raised by some scholars 
of  international law.10
7 Article 287 (2), UNCLOS 1982.
8 ROSENNE, S; SOHN, L. B. United Nations Convention on the Law 
of  the Sea 1982: A Commentary. Dordrecht: Martinuus Nijhoff  Pub-
lishers, 1989. p. 41-42; MERRILLS, J. G. International Dispute Settle-
ment. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 185.
9 MERRILLS, J. G. International Dispute Settlement. 4th ed. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 8.
10 ODA, S. ‘Dispute settlement prospect in the law of  the sea’. 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 44, n. 4, p. 863-
872, 1995. p. 864. He observed that: The rule of  law based upon 
the uniform development of  jurisprudence will be best secured by 
strengthening the role of  the International Court of  Justice, not by 
dispersing the judicial function of  dispute settlement in the interna-
tional community among various scattered organs. The Convention 
is so misguided as to deprive the Court of  its role as the sole organ 
for the judicial settlement of  ocean disputes by setting up a new 
judicial institution, the ITLOS, in parallel with the long-established 
However, this advocacy for ICJ has been challen-
ged mostly by developing countries. Their fear of  pro-
-Western bias of  the ICJ that was specially formed by 
the 1963 judgement of  the Court in Northern Cameroons 
case (Cameroon v. UK) and the 1966 South West Africa cases 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) has even-
tually been the prominent reasons for most of  the third 
world states to negate the ICJ as a forum for the com-
pulsory settlement of  the disputes.11 Moreover even the 
academic concerns in respect of  fragmentation of  in-
ternational law was also well responded by international 
legal scholars.12
The second group was of  the view that the ‘new’ 
law could be more efficiently handled by a new tribunal. 
They argued the need for the special law of  the sea tri-
bunal that would be less rigid, more democratic and re-
presentative and have better understanding of  the new 
law of  the sea. They also pointed out that the ICJ is only 
open to the States but in some law of  the sea matters 
it would be important to allow international organisa-
tions, corporations and individuals the task that could 
not be fulfilled by the ICJ. In this context, it is important 
to note that the International Tribunal for the Law of  
Sea (ITLOS) statute provides standing for the suitable 
entities in proceedings before it.13
The third group pointed towards the rigidness of  
the standing courts or tribunals and thus advocated for 
the more flexible arbitration. (France and Madagascar) 
They were of  the view that the standing courts or tribu-
nals are too rigid because the parties could not choose 
the judges and are abide by the previously determined 
Court.
11 KWIATKOWSKA, B. The international court of  justice and 
the law of  the sea: some reflections. The International Journal of  Marine 
and Coastal Law (IJMCL), v. 11, n. 4, p. 491-532, 1996. p. 499.
12 CHARNEY, J. I. The implications of  expanding international 
dispute settlement systems: the 1982 convention on the law of  the 
sea. American Journal of  International Law (AJIL), v. 90, n. 1, p. 69-75, 
1996. Commenting upon the fear of  fragmentation, she observed 
on p. 72 that “I doubt that the Tribunal for the law of  the Sea or the 
other dispute settlement forums under the convention will fail to 
take appropriate account of  public international law … there is no 
reason to believe … that the tribunals will substantially diverge from 
this body of  law (international law). They are required to decide the 
cases in accordance with the Law of  the Sea Convention and the 
public international law.” 
13 Article 20(2), Annex. VI. Statute of  the International Tribunal 
for the Law of  the Sea, UNCLOS 1982; To support the ITLOS 
as forum, Australia, Cyprus, USA, Yogoslavia, Peru, Zaire, Tunisia, 
Ecuador, and Fiji made their statements in the Plenary during the 
fourth session (1976).
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rules and procedures that are generally lengthy and tar-
dy. The supporters of  this view also argued that parties 
can also design an expeditious arbitration procedure 
that would result in the prompt decisions of  their dis-
putes. There was another group of  States that consi-
dered that most of  the provisions of  the UNCLOS 
involved many technical issues and thus advocated for 
the functional approach that should take care of  the 
technical necessities involved in any dispute. (France, 
German Democratic Republic, Japan, Bulgaria, Poland 
and Trinidad and Tobago).
By providing four different forums, it is expected 
that UNCLOS ensured its wider acceptance and also 
allowed States to manoeuvre their choices of  forums 
for the compulsory dispute settlement. So any declara-
tion by a State Party must take care of  its own interest 
and its chances of  comfort in getting prompt and judi-
cious result that should reflect its legitimate aspirations 
from the Convention. Thus the assessment of  pros and 
cons of  the available options becomes necessary before 
any such declaration. The study now submits its prima-
ry findings as to the suitability of  the forums with res-
pect to India’s interest.
However, initially at the Third Conference on the 
Law of  the Sea, it was noted “States are reluctant to 
give up their control over diplomatic and political op-
tions for resolving disputes, and are more comfortable 
seeking political legitimization, rather than declarations 
of  legal validity, for their actions”.14 In other words, du-
ring the Third Conference, dispute resolution through 
negotiations received “overwhelming support”. Thou-
gh, recently, availability of  a third party process is con-
sidered a deterrent for unilateral interpretation of  the 
terms of  the Convention (for example, US and China 
are continuously making unilateral interpretations of  
the provisions of  the UNCLOS). A further justification 
for the third party process is the perception that it could 
be a way of  protecting less powerful States when dea-
ling with the new subject matter area or less developed 
jurisprudence on the subject (for instances continental 
shelf) in international law. On the other hand, there is a 
provision in the UNCLOS which prevents any misuse 
of  the provisions of  third party process. For instance, 
14 NOYES, J. E. Compulsory third party adjudication and the 
1982 united nations convention on the law of  the sea. Connecticut. 
Journal of  International Law, p. 675-676, 1989. p. 678; See also NOY-
ES, J. E. The international tribunal for the law of  the sea. Cornell 
International Law Journal, v. 32, p. 109-182. 1999. p. 119.
provision regarding safeguards against abuse of  legal 
process under the UNCLOS has recently been used as 
a tool to deter the States from unnecessary suits and 
also to protect coastal States against harassment. In the 
present circumstances, to a certain extent, the need for 
compulsory dispute settlement is certainly justified. In 
brief, recourse to international process provides a check 
on powers granted to States as well as provide a means 
to protect those powers.
India made a declaration upon ratification of  the 
UNCLOS on 29 June 1995:
a) The Government of  the Republic of  India reser-
ves the right to make at the appropriate time the decla-
rations provided for in articles 287 and 298, concerning 
the settlement of  disputes; 
b) The Government of  the Republic of  India un-
derstands that the provisions of  the Convention do 
not authorize other States to carry out in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and on the Continental Shelf  military 
exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving 
the use of  weapons or explosives without the consent 
of  the coastal state.    
The question arise before India that is the present 
India’s declaration sufficient to protect the India’s in-
terest or requires a comprehensive declaration on the 
choice of  forums which may declare specific subjects 
to be covered and not to be covered by these choice of  
forums.
3. AnAlysIs of AdvAntAges And 
dIsAdvAntAges of forums prescrIbed under 
the unclos And stAte prActIce
3.1. Option 1: Arbitration under Annex. VII
Advantages and Disadvantages: The reasons identi-
fied may be advantageous and at the same time it may 
be counter-productive in similar circumstances. In other 
words, the reasons identified for advantages for one or 
other forums in some instances/circumstances can be-
come disadvantageous in other circumstances because 
the reasons advanced for in support or against may not 
impact the subject in similar manner in all circumstan-
ces. The advantages and disadvantages of  any procee-
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dings depend on the facts of  each case. For instances, 
third party interventions in proceeding may in some 
cases be useful for the disputant party or sometime be 
adverse to the interest of  State. However, this study at-
tempts to highlight in general sense the reasons advan-
ced for and against the forums stipulated in Article 287 
of  the UNCLOS.
1. Expenses: As party to the UN Charter and the UN-
CLOS, India is already contributing its share towards 
the functioning of  ICJ and ITLOS. If  India opts for 
arbitration, there must be some concrete justification 
to further incur additional expenditure in the arbitra-
tion proceeding constituted under Annex. VII. Thus, 
as per the provisions of  Annex VII, the arbitral tribu-
nal consists of  five persons. Each disputing party ap-
points one member to the tribunal and the rest three are 
appointed jointly by the disputing parties.15 For these 
appointments, States have to incur extra expenditures 
for their services. In brief, Arbitration tribunals involve 
high costs and high fees paid to arbitrators and court 
registrars, together with rental expenses of  premises in 
which proceedings are carried on, secretarial and inter-
preting services, are well known for the adverse effect 
they have on public opinion. To the contrary, costs of  
the ICJ are borne by the UN.16
2. No Substantial Reasons: Also scholars and legal advi-
sers throughout raise the concern that it may be difficult 
to justify regular financial contribution to the expenses 
of  the ITLOS and ICJ without using them as a forum 
for dispute resolution. Arbitration will always demand 
the constitution of  tribunal and each time state has to 
take extra steps in the constitution of  the tribunal and 
thus to incur additional expenses, while at the same time 
paying towards maintenance of  the ICJ and ITLOS.  
3. Arbitration is more flexible than the procedure 
followed by the ICJ.  Statute and Rules of  which are 
defined in advance and are applied in the same manner 
to all cases brought before it. In the case of  arbitration, 
particularly if  a case is brought before the arbitral court 
on the basis of  a special agreement, the parties have 
more freedom of  movement and option, e.g., for a non-
-public procedure regarding court proceedings, which 
in fact is excluded from the framework of  the Court 
of  Hague.
15 Article 3 (b), (c) and (d), Annex. VII, UNCLOS 1982.
16 KARIOTIS, T. C. (Ed.) Greece and the Law of  the Sea. Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997. p. 170.
4. Confidentiality, Control on the Proceedings and Expe-
diting the Process: As mentioned above, there are both 
pros and cons for arbitration proceedings. Arbitration 
proceedings are mostly confidential and remain com-
pletely in the hands of  the disputing parties. This may 
sometimes be useful in the case, especially in maritime 
boundary disputes where, if  the parties to such a dis-
pute still have outstanding differences with other States 
over their maritime boundaries, they may well not want 
that the arguments that they use in the dispute settle-
ment proceedings to be made public lest this may disad-
vantage their position in negotiations over their other 
outstanding unresolved maritime boundaries.17 From 
appointment of  the arbitrators to the decision about 
procedures and rules of  arbitration are remained under 
the control of  the disputing parties.
However, in the extreme condition of  discord be-
tween the disputing parties as to the appointment of  
three other members, the President of  the ITLOS is au-
thorised to appoint these members.18 These three mem-
bers constitute the majority, thus the basic logic that the 
disputing parties have some control in the constitution 
of  the arbitral tribunal stands little bit compromised. 
However, it also acts as impetus for the disputing par-
ties to promptly agree on the remaining three members.
5. Delay the Process: However, it is possible that one 
party may use this process to delay the appointment of  
above-mentioned three arbitrators and get them ap-
pointed by the President of  the ITLOS or other senior 
most judge of  the tribunal in case the President belongs 
to the nationality of  one of  the disputing parties.19 This 
arbitration procedure, being default in the situation of  
discord as to the choice of  respective forum under Ar-
ticle 287(1), can be invoked by any State party in diver-
sified circumstances. In some circumstances, this option 
for the appointment by the President of  ITLOS may be 
exploited with some ulterior motives.
6. Third Party Intervention: Arbitration does not permit 
third party intervention in any dispute as it may be done 
in proceedings before any standing courts and tribunals. 
This gives the disputing parties latitude to calibrate their 
arguments in different circumstances. Thus, if  any State 
invokes some arguments against another State then a 
17 FREESTONE, D. et. al. The Law of  the Sea: progress and pros-
pects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 396.
18 Article 3 (e), Annex VII, UNCLOS 1982.
19 Article 3 (e), Annex VII, UNCLOS 1982.
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third state cannot intervene in this proceeding to take 
benefit without the wishes of  the disputing parties. 
Hence, it provides flexibility and space to manoeuvre to 
States to settle their dispute. It also gives chances that 
similar kinds of  disputes can be settled using different 
principles with different States. Thus, it may in some 
cases be advantageous and may also result into disad-
vantages. 
7. Time bound: The arbitration proceedings under An-
nex VII are time bound and the traditional excuses of  
delays are not available under this process. 
8. Default Mechanism: Apart from this, the option 
of  arbitration under Annex VII, if  invoked in default, 
prevents or does not give opportunity to the States to 
assess the advantages of  use of  other forums stipula-
ted in Article 287 (1). Some scholars believe that except 
the fact that arbitration remains confidential, immuned 
from third party intervention and facilitates the dispu-
ting parties to use it as an ad hoc measure to solve the 
disputes, the resolution of  the disputes by the arbitral 
tribunal under Annex VII seems not to offer any other 
prominent benefit to the disputing parties.   
9. Lack of  Institutional Commitment with the UNCLOS: 
Annex VII arbitration tribunal is unlikely to have the 
same degree of  institutional commitment to the UN-
CLOS as a standing tribunal like the ITLOS. For ins-
tance, it is almost impossible to imagine the ITLOS 
downplaying the compulsory element in the dispute 
settlement under the UNCLOS in the way that the An-
nex VII arbitration tribunal did in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case.20
10. Last but not least, any government may find it 
difficult to justify before public opinion the implemen-
tation of  an unfavourable ruling issued by an arbitration 
court, which lacks the prestige of  the ICJ. In other wor-
ds, at last, whether win or lose the case, any government 
has to make extra effort to convince the public by in-
terpreting the judgment/award or highlight the positive 
effect of  the judgement/award of  the tribunal, if  any. 
The author noted that the drafting history of  the 
UNCLOS does not provide encouragement for default 
mechanism under Annex. VII, as the proposal made by 
the President of  the Third United Nations Conference 
of  the Law of  the Sea in the Informal Single Negotia-
20 FREESTONE, D. et. al. The Law of  the Sea: progress and pros-
pects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 398.
ting Text (ISNT) on dispute settlement that the ITLOS 
should be default forum was emphatically rejected.21 
Apart from the above-mentioned concerns, the in-
dicative list (attached with this study as Table 1) of  the 
respective declarations made by State parties also indi-
cates the modest and gradual rejection of  the arbitration 
under Annex. VII. In recent cases under the auspices of  
Annex VII Tribunal, its jurisdiction to hear the cases 
were contested vigorously by each of  the defendant Sta-
tes concerned. While proceedings in Saiga and Swordfish 
maritime boundary delimitation cases have remained 
confidential so that it was not possible to know whether 
challenges to the jurisdiction of  the these Annex VII 
arbitration hearing have been made. And subsequently 
these two cases were transferred by means of  agreement 
between the parties to the ITLOS.22 In other words, the 
default jurisdiction vested to Annex VII arbitration is 
also not easily accepted by the States to resolve the law 
of  the sea disputes.  Most of  the countries except ers-
twhile Soviet Block, Canada and Egypt, do not prefer 
arbitration under Annex. VII and declare their choice 
of  either ITLOS or ICJ. Interestingly, Bangladesh has 
also declared ITLOS as its choice with respect to its 
disputes with India and Myanmar in the Bay of  Bengal. 
Thus generally speaking, recent trends are in favour of  
choosing ITLOS as the forum to settle disputes. There 
are views that the declaration should be made indicating 
either of  these two choices to avoid the default invoca-
tion of  arbitration proceeding under Annex. VII.23
Above reasons advanced may require assessment 
of  India’s position in the context of  its role/maritime 
aspirations. For instances, India with a large maritime 
boundary is a coastal State eager to protect and enforce 
its right in its coastal zones. At the same time, India 
is also an aspiring maritime power that strives for its 
significant presence in international waters (freedom of  
navigation). This increases the possibility of  disputes 
with varied circumstances, possibilities and legal issues. 
It is not advisable each time to invoke the arbitration 
21 FREESTONE, D. et. al. The Law of  the Sea: progress and pros-
pects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 398.
22 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000 (2000) 39 
ILM 1359; MOX Plant Case (Irelan v. United Kingdom) Order no. 3 
of  24 June 2003; Cases concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and 
around the Straits of  Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Request for Provi-
sional Measures, Order of  8 October 2003. 
23 FREESTONE, D. et. al. The Law of  the Sea: progress and pros-
pects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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proceedings under Annex VII in which economic bur-
den and uncertainty of  composition always hinge on its 
legitimate aspirations. 
3.2. Option 2: The International Court of Justice
Now author in this the study weighs the suitability 
of  ICJ. Though, ICJ has produced the significant and 
almost coherent jurisprudence on the maritime issues, 
it is basically a body that deals with issues in general 
international law, including those related to the law of  
the sea. However, the view has been expressed that the 
setting  up of  chambers  under the  revised new Rules 
of  the ICJ in 1978 lacks the continuity and cohesion 
of  the Court’s case law. The delicate balances attained 
within the plenary Court, in which the most important 
forms of  civilization are represented nowadays, cannot 
be realized in the case of  setting up chambers consisting 
of  3, 5, or 7 members.24 Besides, for reasons of  policy 
relating to States opting for the alternative of  the cham-
ber, certain judges might be favoured at the expenses 
of  others, the latter remaining excluded.25 However, 
preferences shown by States for Chambers stopped in 
the 1990s and more recent cases being referred to the 
Plenary Court. They are persons with high moral cha-
racter and have eligibility to be appointed as highest ju-
dicial officer in their respective countries or a jurist of  
competence in international law. However, it is difficult 
to guarantee that all the fifteen judges have the deep 
knowledge of  the legal niceties of  the Law of  the Sea.
The ICJ is also a very time consuming process. Its 
involvement with other categories of  disputes generally 
may delay the legal process relating to the law of  the 
sea disputes. It is not always possible to get prompt and 
effective remedy from the ICJ. Moreover, it is the gene-
ral perception that the ICJ is a very politicised body, so 
there are probabilities that some extra legal concerns 
may infiltrate the legal language of  the Court. The con-
trol over the selection procedure of  its members by 
the General Assembly and Security Council also does 
not immune it from considering bare political realities 
24 The question of  composition of  the Chambers was considered 
both from theoretical point of  view as well as by the Court itself  in 
1982, the US and Canada in the Gulf  of  Maine case. See SCHWEBEL, 
S. M. Ad hoc chambers of  the international court of  justice. AJIL, 
v. 81, p. 831-854, 1987. p. 840.
25 SCHWEBEL, S. M. Ad hoc chambers of  the international 
court of  justice. AJIL, v. 81, p. 831-854, 1987. p. 840.
through legal language. 
Apart from this, the procedural jurisprudence esta-
blished by the ICJ, like its judgement in Monetary Gold 
(Preliminary Question) that established the principle that 
where a third State’s legal interests would not only be 
affected by a decision but form the very subject matter 
of  the decision, proceedings may not be maintained in 
the absence of  that third State. The invocation of  this 
principle in politically charged and much criticised East 
Timor judgement of  1995 still evince the political colour 
of  the court. 
The ICJ by virtue of  its jurisprudence also left open 
the chances for the third State to intervene as a non 
party under Article 62 of  the ICJ statute. In the 1990 
judgement of  the Gulf  of  Fonseca (Intervention), the ICJ 
Chamber for the first time granted a State (Nicaragua) 
permission to intervene as a non party under Article 62 
of  the ICJ Statute. Though subsequently the requests 
for the intervention has been dismissed in  1995, but 
this chance of  third state non party intervention will 
always loom large to the prospects of  any dispute reso-
lution through ICJ.26 Also there are instances when the 
Court has taken the view not to decide the case on me-
rits that compromises its chances for providing prompt 
and effective dispute resolution of  the law of  the sea 
disputes. 
Moreover, Article 290 of  the UNCLOS discusses 
the provisions for the issuance of  the provisional mea-
sures. According to this, a Court or tribunal if  satisfied 
about its own jurisdiction in the dispute may issue pro-
visional measures on the request of  a disputing party.27 
To establish this link of  jurisdiction is not always easy in 
case of  the ICJ. Moreover, as per the ICJ statutes, any 
provisional measures prescribed by ICJ must also be 
reported to the Security Council.28 This unnecessarily 
further politicise the issue. 
Probably, these chances of  politicisation of  disputes 
through ICJ have prompted some States to categorically 
declare their rejection of  the ICJ as a forum for com-
pulsory settlement of  disputes. (see, attached Table 1, 
for Algeria and Cuba Declarations). Moreover, if  one 
gives a cursory look to the respective declarations made 
26 KWIATKOWSKA, B. The international court of  justice and 
the law of  the sea – some reflections. The International Journal of  Ma-
rine and Coastal Law (IJMCL), v. 11, n. 4, p. 491-532, 1996. p. 510-511.
27 Article 290 (1), UNCLOS 1982.
28 Article 41, ICJ Statute 1945.
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by the Parties, it becomes quite clear that most of  the 
developing countries have not preferred ICJ or have 
given it secondary priority. Thus, it seems that the pro-
bable political manoeuvring in ICJ and its non efficacy 
in giving prompt and effective remedy deter most of  
the developing States from declaring ICJ as a cherished 
forum for dispute settlement under UNCLOS.29
Importantly, the question of  optional jurisdiction of  
the ICJ as one of  the alternative forums to settle the 
disputes related to the law of  the sea was discussed at 
the First Conference of  the UNCLOS.30At the Confe-
rence, referral of  law of  the sea disputes to the ICJ due 
to its optional jurisdiction was considered inappropriate 
to accord it mandatory jurisdiction. However, India, by 
way of  compromise, proposed that a proviso be added 
to the Article to the effect that the jurisdiction of  the 
ICJ should be subject to Article 36 of  the ICJ Statute.31 
This discussion led the debate how far the declarations 
made by the States under optional jurisdiction of  the 
ICJ could lead or prevent the subject matter for the ju-
risdiction of  the ICJ.
Only 72 out of  193 United Nations member states, 
about 26 percent, have declarations of  acceptance of  
ICJ jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of  the ICJ Statu-
te. Declarations have been made unconditionally or 
on condition of  ‘reciprocity’ on the part of  several or 
certain States. Thus, for example, if  Egypt has not ac-
cepted the compulsory jurisdiction, then even if  Portu-
gal has accepted it, the ICJ would not have jurisdiction 
over a dispute between Portugal and Egypt. States have 
frequently made reservations excluding disputes arising 
before a certain date or even if  the disputes arises after 
such a date, if  it arise out of  facts or situations existing 
before that date (see the Belgian reservation), the dis-
putes prior to that date or falling within specified situa-
tions would be out of  the Court’s jurisdiction. Declara-
tions can be for a specified period of  time, like Brazil’s 
declaration was made to be in application for a certain 
period. Another example is condition of  reciprocity for 
instance Norway Declaration. The UK declaration con-
tains both these reservations.32 In brief, jurisdiction of  
29 KARIOTIS, T. C. (Ed.) Greece and the Law of  the Sea. Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997. p. 175.
30 KLEIN, N. Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of  
the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 15. 
31 KLEIN, N. Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of  
the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 15. India 
Proposal, UN Doc. A/CONF.13/C.4/L.61.
32 COLLIER, J.; LOWE, V. The Settlement of  Disputes in International 
ICJ will rest on the scope of  declaration of  each state. 
This would also indicate that ICJ forum may serve limi-
ted purpose at present.  
Apart from this the forum of  ICJ always makes any 
dispute very high profile. Though there is no hierarchy 
in international law and even the judgements of  the ICJ 
or ITLOS are binding only on parties to the dispute, 
but the mere invocation of  the ICJ put the dispute on 
high pedestal. This may involve emotional involvement 
of  citizenry of  the disputing parties and thus may also 
become the issue in domestic politics. It will unnecessa-
rily complicate the enforcement mechanism and further 
may compromises the prospect of  peace.
Advantages: Through special agreement under Arti-
cle 36(1) of  the Statute to submit the dispute to the ICJ 
has the advantage of  the dispute being concisely defined 
in the special agreement. In fact, contesting parties may 
agree through the special agreement and in advance on 
the exact extent and content of  their dispute, avoiding 
thereby subsequent submission of  preliminary excep-
tions by the defendant, as can happen and has often 
taken place in cases of  unilateral applications. During 
negotiations for special agreement, both litigants may 
agree to refer only part of  their dispute to the Court, 
leaving final settlement to their own discretion.
3.3. Option 3: The International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
1. Expertise: The ITLOS is a special tribunal for the 
law of  the Sea and it consists of  twenty one members. 
These members must be the persons of  high moral cha-
racter and have recognised competence in the Law of  
the Sea. Thus, the recognised competence in the Law of  
the Sea is an essential condition for becoming the mem-
ber of  the tribunal. Article 289 of  the UNCLOS en-
courages the use of  scientific or technical experts who 
may sit with the judges but without a vote.33 This gives 
it more expertise in comparison to ICJ in the matters of  
the law of  the sea.
2. Representative in Nature: The constitution of  the 
ITLOS is also much representative in comparison to 
ICJ. There is no condition in ITLOS that judges of  par-
Law: Institutions and Procedures. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999. p. 141.
33 ANDERSON, D. Modern Law of  the Sea. Leiden: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 2008. p. 514.
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ticular nationalities will always be there on the Bench 
as is the case with the  ICJ in respect of  the perma-
nent members of  the Security Council. The members 
of  ITLOS are elected by the secret ballot by the mem-
ber States. The constitutive Articles also guarantees the 
minimum number of  members from each geographical 
region. According to the present scheme of  affairs, the-
re must not be less than three members from each of  
the following groups. These groups are:
(i) African States, (ii) Asian States, (iii) Eastern Euro-
pean States, (iv) Latin American and Caribbean States, 
(v) Western European States, and (vi) other States.
3. Avoidance of  multiplicity of  forum: The composition of  
ITLOS is more democratic and represents the interests 
of  State Parties in a better way than that of  ICJ. The re-
cord of  the ITLOS is also very persuasive in this respect. 
Moreover, in most of  the cases of  provisional measures 
and prompt release of  vessels and crew, ITLOS almost 
have a compulsory jurisdiction. So there may always be a 
need to deliberate before ITLOS in respect of  these mea-
sures. Thus, any preference of  other forums may engage 
India in two different forums at two successive junctures. 
It unnecessarily increases the burden to be involved in 
two different forums for a similar dispute.  
4. Special Reason for Developing Countries: Apart from 
this, ITLOS is a new specialised body of  the UNCLOS. 
The selection of  its members is governed totally by de-
mocratic processes that remain under the control of  
each and every member State in equal capacity. Pro-
bably these are the decisive concerns that made most 
of  the developing countries to declare ITLOS as their 
choice for compulsory settlement of   disputes.
5. Autonomy: ITLOS is a completely separate entity 
created by the Convention but not an organ of  a larger 
organization, such as the UN, the Council of  Europe or 
the European Community. Such autonomy may bring 
the advantages of  genuine independence. At the same 
time, autonomy increases the numbers of  arrangements 
which have to be put in place at present. Autonomy may 
also mean that the ITLOS has only the periodic meetin-
gs of  the State Parties from which to seek help should 
any unexpected problem arises.34
6. Access to the ITLOS: The jurisdiction of  the ITLOS 
is wide enough to cover non-State entities, such as the 
34 ANDERSON, D. Modern Law of  the Sea. Leiden: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 2008. p. 508.
International Seabed Authority, mining consortia or the 
EC.
7. Application of  other Rules of  International Law and 
Local Remedies Rule: Article 293 provides that courts and 
Tribunals with jurisdiction under the Convention are 
to apply both in terms “and other rules of  internatio-
nal law not incompatible with” the Convention. One 
example of  such other rules is provided by Article 295 
which imports into the procedures the well-known “lo-
cal remedies” rule, according to which an available local 
remedy has to be sought before the recourse is taken 
to an international body. Article 293 means, in practice, 
that the ITLOS will have to consider not only the law 
of  the sea, including customary law on certain matters, 
but also a wide range of  other legal issues. These inclu-
de: the law of  treaties (for instance, the interpretation 
or application of  the Convention as a treaty subject to 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties; or the 
effects of  national declarations); the effects of  previous 
judicial decisions (as in case decided by a Chamber of  
the ICJ about the Gulf  of  Fonesca); and the law of  State 
responsibility, of  which the local remedies rule forms 
part.35
8. Cost Effectiveness: The idea of  “cost effectiveness” 
has been taken from the Agreement of  July 1994 on the 
Implementation of  Part XI of  the Convention. Section 
1 of  the Annex to this Agreement requires all institu-
tions constituted by the Convention to be cost effective. 
This provision applies therefore to the ITLOS as well. 
In practice, the ITLOS is expected to adopt procedures 
which avoid unnecessary expenses, both for the litigants 
and the State parties which fund the ITLOS.
9. Compliance by the Disputant Parties with the Decision 
of  the ITLOS: Article 95 requires each party to a case 
to report to the ITLOS upon its compliance with any 
provisional measures prescribed under Article 290 of  
the UNCLOS.
As per the provisions of  the Convention, if  the dis-
puting parties may not agree upon the similar mecha-
nism for the dispute settlement, the arbitration under 
Annex VII will be invoked automatically. Thus not to 
take risk of  the arbitration procedure and to use the 
more democratic and specialised forum, the study finds 
it appropriate to declare ITLOS as a primary forum for 
35 ANDERSON, D. Modern Law of  the Sea. Leiden: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 2008. p. 509.
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the settlement of  disputes. This will allay the uncertain-
ty as to the forums because it fits with the declarations 
of  the most of  the States that also choose ITLOS.   
3.4. Option 4: Special Arbitration under Annex 
VIII
In respect of  disputes related to particular subject 
matters (disputes concerning fisheries, protection of  
marine environment, marine scientific research and 
navigation), the procedure of  special arbitral tribunal 
under Annex VIII seems, preferred by States. This me-
thod of  settlement is known as ‘functional approach’ to 
dispute settlement under the law of  the Sea. A partial 
attempt was made in the third 1958 Geneva Conven-
tions on the Law of  the Sea, which provided for the ap-
pointment of  experts to decide the disputes relating to 
fishing and conservation of  living resources of  the sea. 
When such a dispute arose, the procedure laid down 
by that Convention envisaged a special commission of  
five members established by agreement between the 
parties. The members were to be drawn ‘from among 
qualified persons being nationals of  states not involved 
in the dispute and specializing in legal, administrative 
or scientific questions relating to fisheries, depending 
upon the nature of  the dispute to be settled’. The deci-
sions of  special commissions were to be made in accor-
dance with scientific and technical criteria set out in the 
Convention and were binding on the States concerned. 
This functional approach to dispute settlement is taken 
considerably further in Annex VIII of  the UNCLOS, 
1982 concerning special arbitration.36
The idea of  ‘functional approach’ was supported 
by some States in the Working Group of  1974 Caracas 
Session (the second session of  the UNCLOS) which 
envisaged that certain law of  the sea disputes will be 
more amenable to settlement by a panel of  technical ex-
perts rather than by judges in courts or tribunals. Thus, 
the Working Group supported the ‘functional approa-
ch’ to dispute settlement under the UNCLOS instead 
of  ‘general approach’. They also believed that not all 
law of  the sea disputes are suitable for settlement ex-
clusively through formal courts of  law or tribunals. The 
question of  relationship between these two approaches 
was addressed by the Working Group subsequently. In 
36 MERRILLS, J. G. International Dispute Settlement. 4th ed. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 196-197.
the course of  the Working Group discussion, it was 
pointed out that the functional approach relied upon a 
rather rigid and artificial classification of  disputes into 
categories which could be difficult to apply in certain 
real situations. An example was given where a foreign 
fishing vessel alleged to have violated certain fishing re-
gulations under the UNCLOS is also alleged to have 
engaged in marine pollution and also interfered with 
the navigation use of  the sea. In this situation, it is not 
certain whether the resulting dispute is to be classified 
as a fisheries dispute or marine pollution dispute or a 
navigation dispute. Thus there would be problems in 
deciding first which of  the functional procedures had 
jurisdiction over the dispute, or problems with litigation 
if  it is decided that separate proceedings be conducted 
against the same vessel in each of  the functional pro-
cedures concerning the respective alleged violations.37
Special arbitration is one of  the binding methods 
of  settlement and will normally be adjudicative. To as-
sist States in setting up a tribunal, list of  experts in each 
of  the four fields are to be maintained by, respectively, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, the UN Envi-
ronmental Programme, the Inter-Governmental Ocea-
nographic Commission and the International Maritime 
Organization. Each State party may nominate to each list 
two experts ‘whose competence in the legal, scientific or 
technical aspects’ of  the fields is established and ‘who 
enjoy the highest reputation for fairness and integrity’ 
(Article 3). It seems that the arrangements for constitu-
ting a tribunal essentially follow the pattern of  concilia-
tion, rather than arbitration, in that each party selects two 
members, preferably from the appropriate list, and the 
president is chosen by agreement. Similarly, vacant places 
must be filled from the appropriate list by the Secretary 
General of  the UN and not the President of  the ITLOS.
Article 5 of  Annex VIII provides that in certain cir-
cumstances its functions can be broadened to include 
fact-finding and conciliation. By agreement the parties 
may set up a special arbitral tribunal to carry out an in-
quiry into the facts of  any dispute of  a type amenable 
to special arbitration. Such a tribunal’s findings of  fact 
are conclusive as between the parties. Thus, the clear ad-
vantage of  machinery of  special arbitration is its addi-
tional form of  conciliation. 
37 ADEDE, A. O. The System for Settlement of  Disputes under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea. Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers, 1987. p. 27-28.
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It is submitted that it is appropriate to leave questions 
involving the discretion of  coastal State to a special 
tribunal in matters related to fishing, marine scientific 
research, and the prevention of  pollution since 
consideration of  equity rather than law is involved.
4. mArItIme delImItAtIon
As mentioned above, Article 298 of  the UNLOS 
allows States Parties to exclude certain categories of  
disputes from compulsory procedures. States may de-
clare when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Con-
vention, or at any time thereafter, that they do not ac-
cept the procedures available under Section 2 for those 
disputes in Article 298. Declarations permitted under 
Article 298 relate, to maritime delimitation disputes in 
relation to the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf  
of  States with opposite of  adjacent coasts as well as 
disputes involving historic bays or title.38 Importantly, 
the dispute-related provisions to special rights in EEZ 
(rights, jurisdiction and duties of  coastal State set in Ar-
ticle 58 of  UNCLOS) will be covered by Article 297 
(1) and not by Article 298 (1)(a).39 In addition, the sco-
pe of  Article 298(1)(a) is limited that a State will only 
be obliged to submit dispute to Conciliation procedure 
which suggest that proposed agreement (on the basis 
of  Conciliation Commission) does provide for a proce-
dure entailing a binding decision only upon mutual con-
sent. In other words, however, importantly, Conciliation 
Commission’s recommendations cannot be subjected 
directly to judicial review.40 Still the UNCLOS allows 
States an option to exclude the subject covered under 
Section 298(1) (a). Importantly, need to also highlight 
that Article 298 title is not “Optional Exception” rather 
title is “Optional Exception to Applicability of  Section 
2”.41
38 It will also apply to outer continental shelf  by analogy.
39 ROSENNE, S; SOHN, L. B. United Nations Convention on the 
Law of  the Sea 1982: A Commentary. Dordrecht: Martinuus Nijhoff  
Publishers, 1989. p. 109.
40 SUAREZ, S. V. The Outer Limits of  the Continental Shelf: Legal 
Aspects of  their Establishment. Heidelberg: Springer, 2008. p. 250.
41 The Socialist States indicated that, “they would not accept 
any formula –nor indeed the whole convention – if  it contained 
provisions on compulsory procedure entailing binding decisions re-
lating to delimitation disputes”. This problem became particularly 
acute when the decision was reached that no reservations could be 
made to the UNCLOS. The compromise reached was that mari-
time delimitation and historic title disputes would be included with 
4.1. India and the Commission on the Limits of 
Continental Shelf
On 11 May 2009, the Republic of  India submitted 
to the Commission on the Limits of  the Continental 
Shelf  (CLCS), in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 
8, of  the UNCLOS, information on the limits of  the 
continental shelf  beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of  the territorial sea 
is measured,42 with the following statement:
According to the submitting State, this is a partial 
submission and, as a coastal state in the Southern part 
of  the Bay of  Bengal, India reserves the right to make 
at a later date, notwithstanding the provisions regarding 
the ten-year period, a separate submission on the outer 
limits of  its continental shelf, based on the provisions 
of  the Statement of  Understanding contained in Annex 
II to the Final Act of  the Third United Nations Confe-
rence on the Law of  the Sea.
India has reserved the right to make a separate se-
cond partial submission of  information and data to su-
pport the outer limits of  continental shelf  in accordan-
ce with the provisions of  the Statement at a later date, 
notwithstanding the provisions regarding the ten-year 
period.43
India has established continental shelf  beyond 200 
nautical miles in the following regions: Eastern Offsho-
re Region comprising the eastern offshore region of  
Mainland India in the Bay of  Bengal and the Western 
Offshore Region of  Andaman Islands; and Western 
Offshore Region of  India in the Arabian Sea.44
India also mentions in its submission that, although 
India has entered into a series of  agreements with its 
the compulsory dispute settlement framework but States could op-
tionally exclude these disputes, subject to an obligation to refer the 
matter to conciliation if  certain conditions were met. Interestingly, 
Section 2 of  Part XV purports to require the use of  the procedure 
entailing a binding decision, on the other hand, the whole purpose 
of  the optional exception and the use of  conciliation is to exclude 
resort to compulsory procedure.
42 It should be noted that the Convention entered into force for 
India on 29 July 1995.
43 The Indian Continental Shelf, Partial Submission to the Com-
mission on the Limits of  the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 
76, paragraph 8 of  the United Nations Convention on the Law of  
the Sea, Executive Summary, Part 1, 2009.
44 The Indian Continental Shelf, Partial Submission to the Com-
mission on the Limits of  the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 
76, paragraph 8 of  the United Nations Convention on the Law of  
the Sea, Executive Summary, Part 1, 2009. paragraph 7.
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many neighbouring coastal States but outer limits of  con-
tinental shelf  with Pakistan, Oman, Sri Lanka, Bangla-
desh and Myanmar are yet to be settled. It further states 
that this submission has been made without prejudice to 
the matters of  delimitation with its neighbouring states.45 
Pakistan, and Oman have also made submissions of  si-
milar pattern. This indicates that States generally make 
Submissions to the Commission without compromising 
with their right to delimit the continental shelf  through 
peaceful means or compulsory binding procedures.
After India made its Submission to the Commission; 
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Oman objected to it and they 
requested the Commission to consider this submission 
without any prejudice to the continental shelf  areas that 
these countries are entitled to.46 India is yet to receive 
the recommendations from the Commission. 
4.2. Conciliation Commission under Annex V of 
the UNCLOS and Overlapping Continental Shelf
Article 298 allows State to exclude the disputes con-
cerning the interpretation or application of  Articles 15, 
74 (Delimitation of  EEZ between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts) and 83 (Delimitation of  Continental 
Shelf  between States with opposite or adjacent coasts). 
Article 298 does not make reference to Article 76 which 
gives definition of  Continental Shelf. This allows some 
scholars to buy an argument that there is no provision 
for an exclusion of  disputes related with outer limits 
of  continental shelf  from the judicial recourse to any 
of  the compulsory procedure enumerated under Arti-
cle 287”.47 However, Article 298 does refer to exclude 
disputes related with Article 83 where issues of  overlap-
ping continental shelf  areas arise. This exclusion can be 
done by making a declaration in writing to this effect in 
accordance with Article 298(1)(a). In that case, Article 
298 applies, with its provision for compulsory recourse 
to conciliation under Annex V. Once provision related 
to Conciliation triggered, States cannot refer the matter 
to compulsory procedures entailing a binding decision 
unless they so agree. 
45 The Indian Continental Shelf, Partial Submission to the Com-
mission on the Limits of  the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 
76, paragraph 8 of  the United Nations Convention on the Law of  
the Sea, Executive Summary, Part 1, 2009. p. 4.
46 Communications made by Myanmar, Bangladesh and Oman 
with respect to the Submission made by India to the Commission. 
47 SUAREZ, S. V. The Outer Limits of  the Continental Shelf: Legal 
Aspects of  their Establishment. Heidelberg: Springer, 2008. p. 230.
4.3. Maritime Delimitation and Choice of 
Forums: India
On 29 October 2015, an Arbitral Tribunal issued its 
award on the questions of  jurisdiction and admissibility 
in the arbitration between the Republic of  Philippines 
and the People’s Republic of  China concerning the Sou-
th China Sea.  In brief, the Tribunal found that it had 
jurisdiction to decide seven of  the Philippines’ fifteen 
substantive claims. In this case, according to China’s 
Position Paper48, China contended that the dispute was 
properly characterised as relating to maritime bounda-
ry delimitation which, for the reasons given below, was 
excluded from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by an exclu-
sionary provision in the UNCLOS that China had acti-
vated in 2006.49
In rejecting this contention, the Tribunal distingui-
shed between a dispute concerning the existence of  an 
entitlement to maritime zones (the present matter), and 
a dispute concerning the delimitation of  those zones 
where parties’ entitlements overlap. The Tribunal also 
emphasised that, while it would determine the nature 
of  particular maritime features in dispute, insofar as this 
resulted in overlapping entitlements between the parties 
the Tribunal’s determination would not go so far as to 
delimit boundaries.50
Therefore, it should be drawn from this case that 
even if  a State excludes jurisdiction under Article 298 
of  UNCLOS, it will continue to apply between claimant 
States concerning the interpretation or application of  
the provisions of  UNCLOS which are not within the 
exclusion in Article 298. They include51:
48 Position Paper of  the Government of  the People’s Republic 
of  China on the Matter of  Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Ar-
bitration initiated by the Republic of  Philippines, 7 December 2014. 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.
shtml>.
49 Position Paper of  the Government of  the People’s Republic 
of  China on the Matter of  Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Ar-
bitration initiated by the Republic of  Philippines, 7 December 2014. 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.
shtml>.
50 Position Paper of  the Government of  the People’s Republic 
of  China on the Matter of  Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Ar-
bitration initiated by the Republic of  Philippines, 7 December 2014. 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.
shtml>.
51 BECKMAN, R. ‘UNCLOS dispute settlement system’ in In-
ternational Conference of  the South China Sea: UNCLOS and 
State Practice’ Organized by National Institute for South China Sea 
Studies Haikou. October 24-25, 2013 <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/
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1. A dispute on whether a feature meets the defi-
nition of  an island under Article 121(1) because it is 
a naturally formed area of  land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide.
2. A dispute on whether an island is a rock which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of  its 
own within Article 121(3) and is therefore not entitled 
to an EEZ or continental shelf  of  its own.
3. A dispute on whether a feature is a low-tide eleva-
tion pursuant to Article 13.
4. A dispute on whether the use of  straight baselines 
by a State is consistent with Article 7.
5. A dispute on the interpretation or application of  
Article 6 on reefs.
Therefore, this widely read award of  the Arbitration 
in South China Sea Case52 have provided a rare opportu-
nity to analyse the scope of  declaration made under Ar-
ticle 298. Hence it is safe to assume that it is not certain 
that through declaration of  exclusion from forums will 
remain excluded in all circumstances from the scope of  
third party adjudications. Undoubtedly, this award will 
influence policy discourses in States reliance on decla-
ration.
Importantly, the beauty of  Article 298 paragraph 
1(a) provides for Compulsory Conciliation which could 
be as effective as other options under the UNCLOS to 
settle the law of  the sea disputes. Compulsory Concilia-
tion puts equal political pressure and needs equal efforts 
as that of  compulsory binding settlement procedures. 
Therefore, the option of  excluding the jurisdiction un-
der Article 298 should be ruled out. In support of  third 
party adjudication or judicial settlement of  maritime 
disputes, Charney concludes that the delimitation of  
maritime zones has been subject to third-party dispute 
settlement in the past despite the highly discretionary 
nature of  the applicable legal principles.53 This history 
could indicate that the subject of  the dispute would be 
conducive to settlement under the compulsory proce-
dures in Part XV of  the UNCLOS. Klein in her study 
wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Beckman-NISCSS-Hainan-Oct-
2013-submitted.pdf>.
52 In the Matter of  the South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case 
Nº 2013-19. <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf>.
53 CHARNEY, J. I. Progress in international maritime boundary 
delimitation law. American Journal of  International Law, v. 88, p. 227-
256, 1994. p. 228.
clarified that this may well be another contributory fac-
tor as to why governments negotiating at the Third Law 
of  the Sea Conference did not insist on the complete 
exclusion of  maritime delimitation dispute from the 
compulsory dispute settlement regime.54 
Another possible approach that could be, keeping in 
view India’s economic, political and strategic sensitivity 
in surrounding oceans where the overlapping claims by 
neighbouring countries are possible, some of  the areas 
(keeping in mind India’s emotive considerations) may 
be excluded from third party jurisdiction. This is legally 
justified as Article 298 (1) (a) (i) makes impliedly that 
a State may exclude the sensitive dispute with one of  
its neighbours but does not want to offend its other 
neighbours by a broad-gaged exclusion. Article 298(1)
(a)(i) says that where disputes relating to sea boundary 
delimitations are separated by a disjunctive “or” from 
disputes involving historic bays or titles, thus enabling 
a State to select only one of  these subcategories for an 
exclusion through its declaration.55 Even if  above men-
tioned implied understanding is questioned, it can be 
argued, undoubtedly, that this is a grey area (gap in law) 
where UNCLOS has not made explicit rules and limited 
declaration of  this nature may be best way to protect 
sensitive areas of  India’ seas. On this basis, India may 
exclude one or two maritime areas (and not all maritime 
areas with all of  its neighbours).
5. declArAtIons of stAtes pArtIes relAtIng 
to settlement of dIsputes In AccordAnce 
wIth ArtIcle 298 (optIonAl exceptIons to 
the ApplIcAbIlIty of pArt xv, sectIon II of 
the conventIon): stAte prActIce
From above-mentioned Table 2, there are 25 States 
out of  60 States which have made declarations under 
Article 298 and have excluded the disputes related to 
maritime delimitation from the compulsory procedure. 
Out of  25 States, there are 7 States who have not even 
made the choice of  forums. (China, France, Gabon, Re-
public of  Korea, Republic of  Palau, Saudi Arabia and 
54 KLEIN, N. Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of  
the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 254.
55 ROSENNE, S; SOHN, L. B. United Nations Convention on the 
Law of  the Sea 1982: A Commentary. Dordrecht: Martinuus Nijhoff  
Publishers, 1989. p. 115.
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Thailand). Author makes an attempt to summarize the 
existing statistics as follows:
1. The expressions (over enthusiasm for 
exclusion) from these 7 States reflects their 
position in this connection either they 
believe that the compulsory procedure may 
be counterproductive or more political/
sovereignty/security aspects are connected 
or as a  precaution this measure is required 
or they have settled their disputes and don’t 
want to open the subject once again for the 
settlement.
Out of  60 States, there are 5 States (Austria, Belgium, 
Cape Verde, Nicaragua and UK) who have not excluded 
the subject from compulsory procedure and also have 
given their choice of  forums. These States have chosen 
forums either ITLOS or ICJ or both where majority of  
States have given preference to ITLOS as a forum.
Out of  60 States, there are 30 States that have not 
expressly made any declarations under Article 298 either 
of  exclusion or non-exclusion.  Among 30 States who 
have not made declarations under Article 298, 4 states 
have not even given choice of  forums i.e, there are 26 
States out of  30 States who have given choice of  foru-
ms but have not shown interest in making declarations. 
These 26 States can be considered as not against per 
se exclusion of  maritime delimitation disputes. Need to 
note that Article 298 is declaration of  exclusion; until 
a declaration is made excepting some disputes, these 
disputes remain within the jurisdiction of  the appro-
priate tribunal designated in accordance with Article 
287 of  the Convention.56 In this situation, absence of  
declaration would amount to non-exclusion of  subject 
from compulsory procedure. Hence, 51 States can be 
understood who have not shown interest in excluding 
the subject (maritime delimitation) from compulsory 
procedure. The author identified various reasons that 
can be advanced for this position: 
a. Article 298 (1)(a) scope is limited in a sense 
that a State will only be obliged to submit 
the dispute to conciliation proceeding and 
the proposed agreement by the Conciliation 
Commission will not be binding on States.
b. One of  the legal reason for non-exclusion can 
be that the past dispute before the UNCLOS 
has been completely excluded from the scope 
of  Article 298(1)(a).  
56 ROSENNE, S; SOHN, L. B. United Nations Convention on the 
Law of  the Sea 1982: A Commentary. Dordrecht: Martinuus Nijhoff  
Publishers, 1989. p. 141.
c. It could be argued this optional exclusion 
potentially denies a range of  advantages 
otherwise accruing to States in dispute but is 
a realistic reflection of  State preferences for 
political, rather than third-party adjudication 
when dealing with an important matter such 
as title. There is a strong belief  that marine 
resources are very important for States and 
required optimal exploitation for its nation 
development. In their view, keeping it away 
from the scope of  Article 298(1)(a) will not 
serve any purpose for States. The importance 
of  international marketability illustrates why 
non-exclusion is an essential complement 
to maritime delimitation. Without legal 
resolution, a State may lose all capacity to 
harvest and market resources – or at best the 
questionable title will significantly diminish the 
value of  the concession – and this is because 
it can no longer market exclusive rights to 
private fishing fleets or oil companies.57
d. Overlapping entitlements “the most 
dangerous disputes” as they lie “at the very 
heart of  sovereignty” may not remain issues 
for these States.58
In Europe, except France, Denmark (excluded only 
from Arbitration under Annex VII), Portugal, Italy, and 
Norway, majority of  west European States have not 
excluded the compulsory procedure of  the UNCLOS. 
As history suggests these five States have grave pain in 
settlement of  disputes related to maritime delimitation 
which essentially become emotive issues. Also these 
States have in principle settled the issue by Court or 
through agreements, and they believe there is no need 
to re-agitate the dispute.59
In brief, it can be suggested that India should not 
exclude the dispute related with maritime delimitation 
mentioned in Article 298(1)(a) of  the UNCLOS.
However, there are States who have made decla-
ration under Article 310 which may have intended to 
either strengthen their positions to either exclusion or 
non-exclusion of  maritime delimitation disputes from 
the scope of  Article 298(1)(a).60
57 KLEIN, N. Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of  
the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 255.
58 KLEIN, N. Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of  
the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 256.
59 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
(Denmark v. Norway), ICJ, Verbatim Record, p. 50-78.
60 China:
 1. In accordance with the provisions of  the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of  the Sea, the People’s Republic of  
China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive 
economic zone of  200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.
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 2. The People’s Republic of  China will effect, through 
consultations, the delimitation of  the boundary of  the maritime ju-
risdiction with the States with coasts opposite or adjacent to China 
respectively on the basis of  international law and in accordance with 
the principle of  equitability.
 3. The People’s Republic of  China reaffirms its sover-
eignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in article 2 of  the 
Law of  the People’s Republic of  China on the territorial sea and the 
contiguous zone, which was promulgated on 25 February 1992.
 Malaysia:
 7. The Malaysian Government interprets article 74 and ar-
ticle 83 to the effect that in the absence of  agreement on the delimi-
tation of  the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf  or other 
maritime zones, for an equitable solution to be achieved, the bound-
ary shall be the median line, namely a line every point of  which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of  the baselines from which the 
breadth of  the territorial sea of  Malaysia and of  such other States is 
measured.
 Malaysia is also of  the view that in accordance with the 
provisions of  the Convention, namely article 56 and article 76, if  
the maritime area is less [than] or to a distance of  200 nautical miles 
from the baselines, the boundary for the continental shelf  and the 
exclusive economic zone shall be on the same line (identical).
 Malta:
 The Government of  Malta interprets article 74 and article 
83 to the effect that in the absence of  agreement on the delimitation 
of  the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf  or other 
maritime zones, for an equitable solution to be achieved, the bound-
ary shall be the median line, namely a line every point of  which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of  the baselines from which the 
breadth of  the territorial waters of  Malta and of  such other States is 
measured.
 Netherlands
 VII. Baselines and delimitation
 A claim that the drawing of  baselines or the delimitation of  mari-
time zones is in accordance with the Convention will only be ac-
ceptable if  such lines and zones have been established in accordance 
with the Convention.
 Oman:
 Declaration No. 5, on the exclusive economic zone
 1. The Sultanate of  Oman determines that its exclusive economic 
zone, in accordance with article 5 of  Royal Decree No. 15/81 dated 
10 February 1981, extends 200 nautical miles in a seaward direc-
tion, measured from the baselines from which the territorial sea is 
measured.
 2. The Sultanate of  Oman possesses sovereign rights over its eco-
nomic zone and also exercises jurisdiction over that zone as pro-
vided for in the Convention. It further declares that, in exercising 
its rights and performing its duties under the Convention in the 
exclusive economic zone, it will have due regard to the rights and 
duties of  other States and will act in a manner compatible with the 
provisions of  the Convention.
 Declaration No. 6, on the continental shelf
 The Sultanate of  Oman exercises over its continental shelf  sover-
eign rights for the purpose of  exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources, as permitted by geographical conditions and in accord-
ance with this Convention.
 Philippines:
   8. The agreement of  the Republic of  the Philippines to the sub-
mission for peaceful resolution, under any of  the procedures pro-
vided in the Convention, of  disputes under article 298 shall not be 
5.1. EEZ and Possible Approach by India
Keeping in view different and varied positions of  
various States on the Coastal States’ rights to enjoy re-
sidual rights in the exclusive economic zone and taking 
a lesson from South China Sea disputes, author su-
ggests that India’s earlier declaration submitted at the 
ratification of  UNCLOS on this aspect are of  limited 
use or there is a strong need to strengthen India’s po-
sition on this issue by specific exclusion of  the subject 
from compulsory procedure of  the UNCLOS. In the 
59th meeting of  UNCLOS negotiations, India suppor-
ted the views of  Iceland, Brazil, Pakistan, Venezuela, 
Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea and Mauritius 
that “hard-won exclusive jurisprudence of  the Coastal 
States in the economic zone should not be jeopardized 
by its submission to third-party adjudication” but In-
dia further said, it will be willing to accept mandatory 
settlement of  disputes relating to navigation in, and 
overflight over, the exclusive economic zone.61 Hence, 
India can continue to maintain its stand on the subject 
of  navigation in, and overflight over, the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. Here it is pertinent to highlight that UK, 
Netherlands, Italy have made statements that in their 
view, the Coastal State does not enjoy residual rights in 
the exclusive economic zone and also went further by 
excluding the disputes enumerated under Article 298(1)
(a) from compulsory procedure.
5.2. Relevancy of Declarations made by States
As discussed above, the importance of  timing of  
submission of  declaration is highly useful and of  strate-
gic importance. The author advances four propositions 
in this regard:
• During the continuation of  declaration,  a State 
which has a declaration regarding the optional 
exception clause (Article 298(1) cannot bring 
disputes falling within that category against any 
other State, even if  that State has not made a 
similar declaration of  exception (Article 298, 
paragraph 3).62
considered as a derogation of  Philippines sovereignty.
61 ROSENNE, S; SOHN, L. B. United Nations Convention on the 
Law of  the Sea 1982: A Commentary. Dordrecht: Martinuus Nijhoff  
Publishers, 1989. p. 93. 
62 UNCLOS Article 298(3).
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• A State making such a declaration may at any 
time withdraw it, or agrees to submit a dispute 
so excluded. Thus, whenever need arises and if  
State (A) is interested to sue other States (B or 
C), a State party may agree in a particular case 
to submit to adjudication a dispute which is ex-
cluded from adjudication by its declaration of  
exemption/exclusion. This differs from gene-
ral withdrawal of  a declaration, as the declared 
exclusions remain applicable to other disputes, 
even those with the State with which the special 
agreement was concluded.63 
• A new declaration or withdrawal of  a declara-
tion, does not in any way affect proceedings 
pending before a court or tribunal unless the 
parties otherwise agree.64 In other words, decla-
ration or withdrawal has no retroactive effect on 
the proceedings.
• Interestingly, a State can withdraw the declara-
tion and at the same time, can file a new declara-
tion which is either broader or narrower.
Importantly, author summarizes that three reasons 
are required to be highlighted related to declarations un-
der Article 298:
Article 299 contains two clauses in which first 
clause says that any dispute excluded under Article 
297 or excepted under Article 298 from the dispute 
settlement procedures provided for in Section 
2 cannot be submitted to such procedure by any 
party to a dispute through unilateral application. 
Any such action might be considered, pursuant to 
Article 294 of  the Convention, “an abuse of  legal 
process” or “prima facie unfounded”. 
The declaration made by States under Article 298 
does not preclude from an agreement to submit 
the dispute to some other procedure outside the 
framework of  Part XV of  the UNCLOS.
Part XV is silent on the legality of  declaration made 
under Article 298 by any forum envisaged under 
Article 287 so it is possible to make a comprehensive 
declaration of  a nature which can deal with the grey 
areas of  the UNCLOS i.e., where there is no law or 
there is a gap in law. This may take care of  issues of  
sensitive matters. It should be used optimally.
As discussed in above of  this study, declaration un-
der Article 298 requires a State to exclude the subjects 
covered under Article 298. In brief, declaration under 
Article 298 is declaration of  exclusion. In other wor-
63 UNCLOS Article 298(2).
64 UNCLOS Article 298(5).
ds, until a declaration is made excepting some disputes, 
these disputes remain within the jurisdiction of  the ap-
propriate tribunal designated in accordance with Article 
287 of  the Convention. In this situation, absence of  
declaration would amount to non-exclusion of  a subject 
from compulsory procedure. Hence, keeping in view 
of  India’s stand during the UNCLOS negotiations and 
India’s strategies in Indian Ocean and specially Arabian 
Sea and its needs for development, India must ensure 
a comprehensive declaration under Article 298 on the 
sensitive matters including military activities. 
6. conclusIon
An examination and assessment of  the different fo-
rums available under Article 297 indicate that at pre-
sent, ITLOS and Arbitration under Annex VII have 
been used extensively by States. 33 States so far ex-
pressly have chosen ITLOS and 11 States have chosen 
expressly Arbitration under Annex VII. However, 44 
States in the Table 1 at page no. 21-22 of  this study 
have not shown their choice of  forums, i.e., by default 
the Arbitration under Annex VII will be the forum for 
settlement of  law of  the sea disputes for these States. It 
means that 44 plus 11 states (total 55 States) are of  the 
view that Arbitration under Annex VII are their pre-
ferred mode of  settlement of  law of  the sea disputes. 
(Discussed in Part I of  this study) In brief, author un-
derlines that ITLOS and Arbitration under Annex VII 
are most preferred forums by States. There should not 
be any doubt on the advantages of  these forums as dis-
cussed above on any given situation.
With regard to ICJ as a preferred mode for law of  
the sea disputes, views are at variance and yet not being 
accepted as preferred mode among States. Indeed, India 
has already made the declaration with regard to optional 
jurisdiction of  ICJ under Article 36(2) of  the ICJ Sta-
tute and excluded various aspects of  maritime disputes 
including maritime delimitation. Similarly, many other 
states have also excluded maritime disputes from ICJ 
jurisdiction. Hence ICJ may only remain a forum with 
mutual consent among parties for “application and in-
terpretation of  UNCLOS”. Unless, India declares the 
jurisdiction of  ICJ or give preference under Article 287, 
jurisdiction of  ICJ is limited use to settle the maritime 
disputes.  
SI
N
G
H
, V
in
ai 
K
um
ar
. A
na
lys
is 
of
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
s a
nd
 d
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
s o
f 
fo
ru
m
s p
re
sc
rib
ed
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
U
N
CL
O
S 
an
d 
st
at
e 
pr
ac
tic
e: 
th
e 
w
ay
 a
he
ad
 fo
r I
nd
ia.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
13
, 
n.
 3
, 2
01
6 
p.
 3
18
-3
36
335
The author in this study finds that 51 States have 
not shown interest in excluding the subject (maritime 
delimitation) from compulsory procedure. In Euro-
pe, except France, Denmark (from Arbitration under 
Annex  VII), Portugal, Italy, and Norway, majority of  
west European States have not excluded the compul-
sory procedure of  the UNCLOS. As history suggests 
these five above-mentioned States have grave pains in 
settlement of  disputes related to maritime delimitation 
which essentially become emotive issues. Also these 
States have in principle settled the issue by Court or 
through agreements, and they believe there is no need 
to re-agitate the dispute. Keeping in view the study’s 
finding, author suggests that India should not exclude 
the dispute related to maritime delimitation mentioned 
in Article 298(1)(a) of  the UNCLOS. This position of  
non-exclusion of  maritime delimitation can also get su-
pport from the view of  Dr. P. S. Rao’s concurring and 
dissenting opinion and separate opinion in the Case of  
Bay of  Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangla-
desh and India.65 In his view, Dr. P. S. Rao stated, “I stron-
gly disagree both as a matter of  law and policy with the 
creation of  a “grey area” as a result of  the adjustment 
the majority made to the provisional equidistance line, 
in a not insignificant expanse of  the Bay of  Bengal.” 
In brief, the legality of  grey area remains a juristic task 
which India would like to agitate this matter whenever 
situation will arise.” It seems Dr. P. S. Rao is well aware 
that due to creation of  this area, India could not get eco-
nomically resourceful advantages in the Bay of  Bengal. 
Excluding the maritime delimitation from compulsory 
procedure of  the UNCLOS may hurt India’s interest 
in long time. However, as mentioned above in Part III, 
author supports the views that India may adopt another 
alternative approach by excluding one or two maritime 
areas by making declaration under Article 298 (and not 
all maritime areas with all of  India’s neighbours).
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